THE TYLENOL MURDERS

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The 1986 Tylenol Murder
 
 

 
 

  THE 1986 TYLENOL MURDER WILL BE SOLVED THIS SUMMER

Westchester District Attorney Carl Vergari was close to single-handedly solving the 1986 Tylenol murder before he was silenced by the FBI.  Vergari's investigation will be re-activated in the The Tylenol Mafia, and from beyond the grave Carl Vergari will finish what he started.

 
People continued to die from contaminated Tylenol capsules after the seven Tylenol murders in 1982, but their deaths didn't capture national media attention, so J&J ignored them. FDA public information officer William Grigg said in 1986 that since the seven Tylenol poisoning deaths in 1982, "there had been several incidents in which people were poisoned with Tylenol capsules."
 
J&J executives knew in 1982 that the Tylenol killer exploited a danger specific to capsules - the ease in which they can be opened and the medicine replaced with poison - but they refused to discontinue Tylenol in capsule form. Tylenol capsules were easier, and more importantly, less costly to produce than tablets.
Acetaminophen is not ordinarily amenable to tableting by the same methods as aspirin. These materials have significantly different properties. Crystalline aspirin is easily tableted, since the crystals are quite soft and exhibit good plasticity/elasticity when compacted to tablets. Further, cohesive/adhesive bonding within the aspirin tablet is strong and the aspirin, itself, provides good lubricity to the formula.
 
In contrast, acetaminophen crystals are very hard and brittle and fracture very easily. The crystals have essentially no plasticity/elasticity and can be tableted by the normal aspirin tableting methods only by using high levels of excipients and large crystalline grade acetaminophen.  Furthermore, at least 25% more excipients are required in addition to high levels of lubricant. The large acetaminophen crystals have the disadvantage of being slowly dissolved in the body and require additional tableting aids to increase the rate of dissolution.
 
Had J&J eliminated capsules, many repackagers would have had to purchase new equipment for sealing Tylenol capsules or for tableting Tylenol. Either change would have increased production costs and negatively affected profit margins for Johnson & Johnson and their customers. So instead of acknowledging that the true tampering risk came from J&J’s use of capsules, CEO James Burke reintroduced Tylenol capsules in November 1982, supposedly guarded by “tamper-resistant” packaging. J&J made the choice they always make; profit over safety.
 
Burke himself chaired the committee on “tamper-resistant” packaging that rushed this flawed system back to market on Nov. 11, 1982.
 
The tamper-resistant seals on the Tylenol bottle containing poisoned capsules that killed Diane Elsroth in 1986 had not been broken.
 
 
Cheap Manual Capsule Filler
 
 
 
Tamper-resistant packaging would have done nothing to stop the Tylenol killer from adulterating Tylenol capsules in 1982, because the Tylenol killer didn't poison the Extra-Strength Tylenol capsules after the bottles were shipped to the retail stores. The Tylenol killer put cyanide into the capsules before they were bottled and before they were shipped to the retail stores. Tamper-resistant packaging did nothing to thwart another Tylenol murder in 1986, because just like in 1982, the killer adulterated the capsules before they were bottled and packaged.
 
It took the 1986 Tylenol murder to get Johnson & Johnson to discontinue the capsule version of Tylenol. But J&J didn't eliminate capsules because of the danger they presented. J&J discontinued Tylenol capsules because their market research showed that the public no longer trusted capsules. The decision had nothing to do with safety; it was simply a marketing decision that had everything to do with Johnson & Johnson's profits.
 
One might even take Johnson & Johnson to task for ever having put Tylenol capsules on the market in the first place.
 
Up until 1975, Tylenol wasn't available in capsules. It was James Burke who one year before being promoted to J&J CEO decided to launch Tylenol capsules. Burke might claim that the only reason he launched Tylenol in capsule form was because he felt that consumers preferred capsules over tablets, but I believe Burkes' decision was based primarily on other factors.
 
Burke won support from J&J's board of directors to promote Tylenol in the mass market in 1975. Previously, Tylenol was promoted only in hospitals. In order to be competitive in the retail market, Burke had to overcome one major disadvantage; price. Since the process of tableting acetaminophen (Tylenol) was more costly than tableting aspirin, Tylenol was much more expensive than other OTC analgesics.
 
The obvious solution to the price disadvantage was to produce Tylenol in the less costly capsule form. Also important was the fact that even many of the smallest pharmacies had equipment to encapsulate Tylenol, but most did not have the capability to tablet Tylenol. Besides reducing cost, Burke's decision to produce Tylenol in capsule form also increased the risk of tampering.
 
The McNeil Consumer Products Company was created in 1976 to focus exclusively on the consumer product opportunity for Tylenol. It did so with great success, guiding Tylenol to the preeminent brand in the over-the-counter analgesic business.
 
Between April 1982 and February 1986, at least ten people died after swallowing Tylenol capsules that had been filled with cyanide.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Murder and the Cover-up

 
On February 8, 1986, Diane Elsroth died after ingesting two cyanide laced Extra-Strength Tylenol capsules from a bottle that had been purchased at an A&P store in Bronxville, NY. The Bronxville A&P received all of its Tylenol from the same distribution center that shipped the cyanide laced Tylenol responsible for the seven Chicago-area deaths in 1982.
 
Once again, local and national media outlets covered the 1986 Tylenol tampering story extensively. The tone of the murder investigation was the same as in 1982, and the results were equally dismal.
 
J&J CEO James Burke learned of Elsroth's death about 4 P.M. on Monday, February 10. He ordered what turned out to be continuous polling of consumers to monitor their fears about, perceptions of and intentions toward all Tylenol products.
 
Johnson & Johnson immediately sent representatives to Yonkers to attempt to learn more and to assist in the investigation. J&J also began conferring by telephone with the FDA and FBI, both in Washington and at the respective field offices. 
 
On February 11, FDA spokesman William Grigg said the FDA inspected the factory where the pills were made and determined that "there were no indications that it (the contamination) could be the result of the manufacturing.
How is it possible that the FDA determined on the very same day they learned about the poisoning that "there were no indications that it (the contamination) could be the result of the manufacturing"?
 
William Grigg went on to say that it was unlikely the drug had been tampered with during manufacturing.
''Everyone involved believes that this is a local situation,'' said Grigg.

 

"Cyanide would eat through a gelatin capsule in 8 to 10 days," meaning it had been added since the Tylenol left the plant, and that therefore the poison presumably was placed in the bottles within the last 10 days, said Dr. Millard Hyland, Westchester County's chief medical examiner.

 

J&J spokesman James Murray said that based on Hyland's finding that the cyanide would have eaten through the capsules, the company feels the tampering "did not take place at the factory."

 

At a February 11 news conference held at Johnson & Johnson headquarters, McNeil president Joseph Chiesa, while standing next to CEO James Burke, said:

''We have conviction'' that none of the poison was put in the capsules by a worker at the plant. He added that cyanide breaks down the gelatin-based capsules and that the deterioration becomes evident ''in less than a month.''

 

FDA spokesman William Grigg, at a separate press conference, said:

“We have conviction that none of the poison was put in the capsules by a worker at the plant.” Cyanide breaks down the gelatin based capsules and deterioration becomes evident “in less than a month.”

 

Countering the statements made by Hyland, Murray, Chiesa, and Grigg, was Westchester District Attorney Carl Vergari, who said he'd learned from federal authorities that the cyanide laced Tylenol capsules would not show signs of deterioration in 8 to 10 days; that they may have an indefinite shelf life. 

 

Then, on February 14, federal authorities admitted that the cyanide found in a Tylenol capsule that killed a woman could have been put there months ago.

"The work we did showed no time restrictions such as were previously reported," said FDA Commissioner Dr. Frank Young.

 

The evidence cited by Officials as proof that the Tylenol had been adulterated very recently, after it reached the local stores, was soundly refuted. The cyanide laced Tylenol capsules had an indefinite shelf-life, just as Carl Vergari had said. Therefore, the Tylenol capsules could have been poisoned weeks, months, or even a year earlier. They could have been poisoned at the local distribution center or they could have been poisoned while sitting in Johnson & Johnson's regional distribution facility in Montgomeryville, PA.

 

 

Contradictions

 

Much of the evidence made public after the 1986 Tylenol tampering conflicted with evidence from the 1982 Tylenol murders investigation. Careless statements made by J&J executives and government officials in 1986 contradicted statements they’d made in 1982.


Most interesting are statements made by J&J CEO James Burke during interviews with the press and on national television. Burke, apparently emboldened by his success in covering up facts in the 1982 Tylenol murders investigation seemed to believe every word he uttered would be treated as gospel by the media and the public.
 
He’d gotten away with his cock-sure attitude in 1982, but each time Burke shot his mouth off in 1986 he revealed a new piece of information that provided another clue to the workings of the Tylenol murders cover-up. Burke never imagined that every statement he made would be so readily available via the internet to some schmuck like me 26 years later. Burke never realized his many ludicrous mis-statements, which he’d likely attribute to his “bravado”, would be so useful in exposing just how culpable Burke and Johnson & Johnson were for the failures of the Tylenol murders investigations.
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE FBI COVER-UP
 

“The bottles were tampered with locally, at the retail store” aspect of the approved theory - the most important component of the cover up - was exposed as a fraud after the 1986 Tylenol murder and then very sloppily covered up by the FBI.

 

Westchester District Attorney Carl Vergari revealed evidence about the tampering that officials from the FBI, FDA, and J&J did not want publicized.

 

 

THE VERGARI PROBLEM

 

The cornerstone of the approved theory of the Tylenol murders deception ran into trouble when on February 18, 1986 Carl Vergari held a press conference and reiterated findings revealed to him by FBI scientists. Vergari said Federal investigators found no evidence that the triple seals on the bottles of tainted Tylenol had been broken after they left the factory, suggesting that they might have been tampered with there (at the factory).

The two bottles that contained contaminated capsules were sent to the FBI labs to determine “to a reasonable degree of certainty” through microscopic examination “whether the metal foil that’s heat-welded to the top of the bottle has been tampered with after it left the factory.”

 

“And they say in both cases that their laboratory examination reveals that it was not,” he said, ”that these bottles were not tampered with after they left the factory; that, ergo, the contamination was done at some time during the manufacturing process before the seal was placed on it.”

 

“What could be clearer than that?” Vergari said.

 

FBI spokesman Jack French declined to confirm or deny Vergari’s assertion. But the fact remained; the FBI’s own evidence didn’t fit the approved theory.  Since the packaging hadn’t been tampered with, the Tylenol capsules had to have been laced with cyanide before the bottles were packaged and before they were placed on the local retail store shelves. Vergari was missing a critical piece of evidence that kept him from connecting all the dots. He didn't know the Tylenol hadn't been packaged at the factory; it was packaged at repackaging facilities across the country.

 

Although the evidence made it crystal clear that the Tylenol had not been adulterated at the local retail stores, the FBI refused to deviate from their story. Milt Ahlerich, chief of public affairs for the FBI, said the lack of evidence “does not mean that the tampering did not occur."

 

Here again, despite the FBI’s own evidence showing otherwise, it publically discounted the findings made in their own lab by their own investigators. Ahlerich's statement that “the lack of evidence does not mean that the tampering did not occur,” was especially ridiculous.

 

Some FBI lab guy had obviously not been brought into the loop regarding the approved theory of the Tylenol murders.

 

J&J and FDA officials quickly weighed in on the discussion by making public statements intended to discredit Vergari. Their erroneous statements were considered facts in the minds of the media and the public. Officials from the FDA and J&J said, “The weight of evidence suggested that the crime was a local one.”

 

James Burke appeared on "The Donahue Show" and said:

“We do not have any proof it didn’t happen in the plant or the warehouse, but all logic tells us it didn’t.”

Burke went on to note the ''considerable amount of confusion'' in the case that may have led to an opinion held by Carl Vergari, the Westchester County District Attorney, who had said he believes the pills were probably adulterated at the manufacturing plants.

What confusion was Burke talking about? There wasn't any question that the FBI found absolutely no evidence that any of the tamper resistant seals had been tampered with. If there was any confusion, it was created because of deceptive statements made by Burke, Ahlerich, and FDA Commissioner Frank Young. Statements made by these individuals had no basis in fact and conflicted with the very simple truth that the Tylenol capsules had been adulterated during distribution before any of the deadly capsules were delivered to the local retail stores.

The all out marketing blitz to deceive the public didn’t change the fact that Vergari had spilled the beans. The packaging on the Tylenol bottles had not been tampered with. Evidence from the FBI's own inspection confirmed this fact, creating a real problem for proponents of the approved theory.

To rectify this problem the FBI was forced to take action to quash this troubling truth. So it did what any self respecting government agency would do when faced with a situation such as this. They ordered a bogus second inspection of the tamper resistant packaging and then made up evidence that aligned with the approved theory.

For their second inspection the FBI claimed to have used a sophisticated ultra hi-tech investigatory technique; a technique that the FBI refused to disclose to the public.

The FBI's second inspection wasn't really done with the help of some top secret ultra hi-tech equipment. In fact, there was no second inspection; it wasn’t needed. The only equipment needed to get the desired results from the second inspection were the pen and paper used to produce the press release that seemingly fit the approved theory of the Tylenol murders.

 

McNeil Consumer Products Co. - Fort Washington, PA

 

 

 

THE TAMPER-RESISTANT INSPECTION SCAM

 

On February 26, in response to questions about the progress of the case over the previous few weeks, Milt Ahlerich, chief of public affairs for the FBI held a press conference in which he issued this statement:

“Previously undetected signs of tampering have now been discovered using sophisticated scientific examinations. Our examinations have further determined it was possible to invade the bottles after packaging was complete without detection through conventional means of examination.”

 

Ahlerich said the bureau was releasing this information “because of the intense national interest in the case.”

 

Ahlerich refused to comment further, but several "un-named authorities" confirmed that the bureau’s findings applied to both bottles of tainted capsules.

 

Ahlerich’s statement contradicted the original FBI findings that had been revealed publically by Carl Vergari. Ahlerich offered no explanation and supplied no proof that the packaging had been tampered with, but his statement, which in fact revealed no new information, did seem to comply with the official “approved theory”.

 

A spokesman for Johnson & Johnson jumped all over the FBI’s reversal, saying that the company welcomed the FBI’s finding.

“The company has contended that it was extremely unlikely that the capsules were tainted during the manufacturing process,” said J&J spokesman, James Murray. We were puzzled all along as to how someone could have breached the three safety seals on the bottle and carton without being detected. We find the FBI statement very interesting.”

 

In my days at Johnson & Johnson, I learned that when J&J employees replied to my emails with statements like - “Your findings are very interesting,” or, “I’m puzzled by these results”, or, “This is very interesting, what does 'so-and-so' think about this?” - I knew what they really meant was, “I’m not going to confirm or deny anything because I don’t want my lie documented in this email."

 

 

 

Officials Inspect J&J's Manufacturing Facility

 

Days before Ahlerich's press conference, Carl Vergari said he planned to inspect the McNeil plant in Fort Washington, PA to "look into the possibility that the adulteration had occurred there.” Vergari said, “their review would examine manufacturing processes and might include employee personnel files."

 

Prior to Ahlerich's press conference, a team of investigators, including officials from Vergari's office, visited the McNeil plant. AfterwardVergari said that the tour by a team of investigators suggested additional broad areas of inquiries.” 

Vergari added that the case of the poisoned Extra-Strength Tylenol capsules is "still wide open," but refused to elaborate on the inspection tour of the manufacturing plant on Monday. "We still haven't eliminated anything," Vergari said. "We haven't had evidence to exclude tampering at the factory."

 

Shortly after Vergari determined there were still "broad areas of inquiries" at the factory, and it appeared he would intensify his investigation of McNeil Consumer Products, FBI Director Milt Ahlerich came out with an official FBI statement designed to convince the public that the Tylenol bottles had been tampered with at the local retail stores.

 

One day after Vergari said he hadn't excluded tampering at the McNeil factory, the FBI reversed their initial findings regarding the tamper-resistant packaging. Accordingly, there would be no need for upstart Carl Vergari to pursue his investigation.

 

There were of course plenty of reasons for Vergari to continue to pursue his investigation. The facts hadn’t changed. But the Tylenol murder investigations were never about getting to the truth.

 

Never again would Carl Vergari be heard from with regard to the 1986 Tylenol murder investigation.

 

Two weeks after FDA official William Grigg stated, “Everyone involved believes that this is a local situation,” he’d gotten everybody in line. With the truth obscured, authorities could now focus the public’s attention back on the search for a fictitious unemployed psychopath.

 

 

Johnson & Johnson Regional Distribution Center - Montgomeryville, PA
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
 
 
Carl Vergari: The Man who could have solved the 1986 Tylenol Murder was Silenced
 
 

Feb 12, 1986 - Carl Vergari said that the contamination of the capsules "could have happened anywhere" and several theories were being investigated. He said tampering at the factory had not been ruled out, despite county medical examiner, Dr. Millard Hyland's, contention that the cyanide found In the Tylenol would have eaten through the capsules In eight to 10 days.

"It might have happened at the factory, it might have happened during shipping, it might have happened at the store," Vergari said.

 

Vergari went on to say, "We have developed several avenues of investigation by the combined team of Yonkers detectives, the FBI and the Homicide Bureau of the Westchester District Attorney's office. There will be no further comments at this time."

 

Feb 16, 1986 - Authorities reversed there earlier statement regarding the time it would take cyanide to degrade gel-based Tylenol capsules. The cyanide found in a Tylenol capsule that killed Diane Elsroth could have been put there months ago, federal authorities said.

"The work we did showed no time restrictions such as were previously reported," said FDA Commissioner Dr. Frank Young, referring to statements by Westchester County authorities that the poison would dissolve the capsule's gelatin casing in eight to 10 days.

 

Vergari said he was concerned such statements had created "the false and dangerous impression that people shouldn't worry about the bottles they bought before that time."

 

J&J CEO James Burke disagreed with Westchester District Attorney Carl Vergari, who said FBI test results led him to believe the capsules were poisoned "at the plant" Vergari said FBI officials told him that tests indicated the seals on both tainted bottles bad not been broken after they left the factory. FBI spokesman Bill Baker would not comment on Vergari's statement.

 

Feb 18, 1986 - Vergari said that federal investigators had ruled out the possibility that the safety seals on the bottles had been broken after the capsules had been put inside. Vergari said the Federal Bureau of Investigation had come to this conclusion after extensive tests of the bottles.

 

Feb 19, 1986 - After a tour at Johnson & Johnsons' McNeil Consumer Products manufacturing facility in Fort Washington, PA, Vergari said:

The tour "suggested additional broad areas of inquiries." He added that the case of the poisoned Extra- Strength Tylenol capsules is "still wide open," but refused to elaborate on the inspection tour of the Fort Washington, Pa., manufacturing plant Monday by one of his assistants.

 

Vergari said that FBI tests on the packaging of both bottles (that contained cyanide laced Tylenol) has shown to "a reasonable certainty" that the tampering occurred at time of manufacture.

"We still haven't eliminated anything," Vergari said. "We haven't had evidence to exclude tampering at the factory."

 

Johnson & Johnson claims the bottle from which Ms. Elsroth took the fatal capsules was manufactured in Pennsylvania while the second was made in Puerto Rico.

"That's their defense," Vergari said.

'Their defense," as Vergari called it, wasn't a very good one. The Tylenol in each bottle may have been manufactured 1,000 miles apart, but the Tylenol found in both bottles had been repackaged at the same distributions facility in Montgomeryville, PA.

 

Feb 26, 1986 - After FBI Director Milt Ahlerichs' bogus statement indicating that the tamper-resistant packaging had been tampered with, the media, and therefore the public, seemed convinced that the bottles had been tampered with at the retail stores. Ahlerichs' public statement came just one week after Vergari had sent his own investigators out to the McNeil manufacturing facility. Vergari said that the tour by a team of investigators:

“suggested additional broad areas of inquiries.” 

 

Vergari added that the case of the poisoned Extra-Strength Tylenol capsules is "still wide open," but refused to elaborate on the inspection tour of the manufacturing plant on Monday. "We still haven't eliminated anything," Vergari said. "We haven't had evidence to exclude tampering at the factory."

 

But now, one week after the inspection, the FBI reversed their initial findings regarding the tamper-resistant packaging.

 

Never again was Carl Vergari heard from regarding the 1986 Tylenol murder investigation.

 

With the truth obscured, authorities could now carry-out their cover-up of Diane Elsroths' murder.

 

 

 

 

News Articles

 

 

OFFICIALS SAY FATAL TAMPERING OF TYLENOL WAS ISOLATED CASE

February 11, 1986

 

Federal officials said it was unlikely that the drug, which is produced by a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, had been tampered with during manufacturing. ''Everyone involved believes that this is a local situation,'' said William Griggs, a spokesman for the Federal Food and Drug Administration.

 

He said Federal officials based this opinion on two main elements. First, he said, the bottle was part of a lot of 200,000 units manufactured in May 1985; second, the lot was shipped for sale in August and, because it is a popular item, most of the lot's units were likely sold within a month. Thus, he said, if other bottles in the shipment had been tainted, officials would probably have known about it long before this week.

 

Extra-Strength Tylenol capsules are sold in packages labeled ''safety sealed.'' The outer carton is sealed with what industry experts call a ''hot-melt'' adhesive. The cardboard is thin gauge so that the flaps, sealed with the adhesive, cannot be opened normally without ripping the box.

 

The cap is sealed to the lip of the bottle with a plastic band that is ''heat shrunk'' for a tight fit and must be torn away. Underneath the cap, an aluminum foil seal is laminated to the lip of the container.

 
 
 

February 14, 1986

 

NEW BRUNSWICK, N.J. (UPI) — The maker of Tylenol refuses to speculate on how a poisoner could slip cyanide into capsules of the popular painkiller without breaking the three seals that protect each package.

 

Johnson & Johnson Co., in the wake of the discovery Thursday of a second tainted bottle of Tylenol in suburban New York, warned all consumers to immediately stop using the capsule form of the product. The nationwide warning, issued by Chairman James Burke through a spokesman, came within minutes of the health products company learning from federal investigators Thursday evening of the newly discovered tampering.

 

"All we have said in the past is that the packaging is tamper-resistant or tamper-evident," spokesman Robert Kniffin said from corporate headquarters in New Brunswick. "We never said it is tamper-proof."

 

Kniffin said Johnson & Johnson had no comment on how cyanide might be introduced into capsules in unopened packages protected by glued flaps on the boxes. Each bottle also is protected with a tight plastic seal over the cap and neck and a durable foil seal directly over the mouth and underneath the cap.

 

The three-layered protection is three times what was required by the Food and Drug Administration after the fatal 1982 Chicago Tylenol poisonings, Johnson & Johnson spokesman Bob Andrews said. FDA scientists investigating the death of Diane Eisroth, 23, of Peekskill, N.Y., who took two capsules of the over-the-counter drug made the new discovery. FDA Commissioner Frank Young said the outside seal was unbroken on the bottle that had been confirmed as tainted.

 
 

 

 

FEW LEADS AND NO SUSPECTS FOUND IN TYLENOL DEATH IN WESTCHESTER

 

By EDWARD HUDSON, SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES

March 23, 1986

A spokesman for the Federal Food and Drug Administration, William Grigg, said this week that his agency had ''essentially completed'' its examination of Tylenol capsules taken from stores in Westchester and other areas around the country.

 

Mr. Grigg said the agency had used chemical analysis and X-rays to look for tainted capsules. The X-ray system, which he said ''can spot something without even opening the package,'' was developed after seven people died in the Chicago area several years ago from cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules.

 

Last month, Johnson & Johnson announced it was discontinuing the manufacture and sale of all its over-the-counter medications in capsule form.

 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation said later that an analysis of the two bottles that contained cyanide-laced capsules showed the bottles had been tampered with, but it did not say how.

According to Mr. Grigg, complaints of tampering involving many kinds of products have risen sharply since the Bronxville Tylenol case, but ''so far as we're aware,'' he said, none involved serious injury.
 
 
 
 
Chicago Reaction to the 1986 Tylenol murder
 

Illinois police keep close tabs on 3 in tainted Tylenol probe

 

ANDREW H. MALCOLM New York Times

SUN 02/23/1986

 

CHICAGO - The Illinois state police say they are closely following three leads in the continuing investigation into the deaths of seven residents of the Chicago area from cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules more than three years ago.

A spokesman in Springfield, Ill., acknowledged three "active leads, three individuals of continuing interest to us." The spokesman, Bob Fletcher, declined to elaborate, but he said no arrests were expected soon.

Renewed attention has been focused on the poisonings since a similar Tylenol capsule poisoning of a woman last week in Bronxville, N.Y., Johnson & Johnson, the parent company of Tylenol's maker, has halted further production of all nonprescription capsules.

Using computers and tips from 50 states and 12 foreign countries, the Illinois police amassed thousands of pieces of information, which are constantly being expanded and cross-referenced by computer for new leads. Besides the 35 state agents assigned at the height of the investigation, detectives from two counties, five municipalities and the Federal Bureau of Investigation worked on the case, which remains open although no agents are now on the case full time.

Fletcher said Illinois had made available to New York all its investigative material, more than 6,000 leads, which he said filled six filing cabinets. "A lead," the spokesman said, "is a person, a license plate, a list of disgruntled Johnson & Johnson employees, Tylenol's shippers, people with access to that poison."

"The New York case," Fletcher said, "has created renewed interest in the Illinois murders, but so far it hasn't furthered our own investigation any."

Last week Illinois stores were ordered to remove all Tylenol capsules. Dr. Bernard J. Turnock, director of the State Department of Public Health, said people in the state "quite rightfully are more sensitive because of the Tylenol tragedy here in 1982."

A Health Department spokesman, Paul O'Connor, said no traces of cyanide were found in the 60 lots sampled.

However, the Illinois poisonings, which occurred in scattered families here and in four suburbs from Sept. 29 to Oct. 1, 1982, "spawned a virtual epidemic of similar cases around the country," said Fletcher.

Two early suspects, James W. Lewis and Roger Arnold, are both in prison on other charges. Lewis, who sought $1 million from Tylenol's maker, his wife's former employer, is serving a 10-year term for extortion. Arnold, a former employee of Jewel Food and Drug Stores, where some of the 1982 poisoned capsules were purchased, has been imprisoned for the June 18, 1983, slaying of a man he believed had identified him to the police as a potential Tylenol suspect.

"This is an unusually tough case," said Fletcher, "There's little physical evidence. The victims and the tainted bottles show no pattern. And the motive is unclear.

"Of course, the killer could have been operating on a completely rational plan that we simply don't perceive yet. It's enormously frustrating."

The case is also complicated because of the broad accessibility of cyanide; it is widely used in manufacturing and treatment of ink, steel, finished paper and jewelry and in agriculture.

As part of the Illinois investigation, the authorities compiled a profile of the murderer describing him as a quiet, reserved, middle-aged male, probably Caucasian and extremely intelligent although withdrawn. "However," Fletcher added, "that probably narrows it down to about a quarter of the American population."

 
 
 
 
 
Johnson & Johnson loaded Doctor's Offices with short-dated Tylenol samples shortly after the 1986 Tylenol murder.
 
One McNeil sales rep suffered the consequences; thanks to a couple of spineless McNeil executives and a hot-tempered doctor.
 
Devries v. McNeil Consumer Products Co.
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division

Decided: July 25, 1991.

 

NANCY L. DEVRIES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

v.

MCNEIL CONSUMER PRODUCTS CO. DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND JOHNSON & JOHNSON, INC., DEFENDANT

 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County.

Julian R. Birnbaum, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellant (Karen Honeycutt, attorney).

Francis X. Dee argued the cause for respondent (Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, attorneys).

Michels, Gruccio and D'Annunzio. The opinion of the court was delivered by D'Annunzio, J.A.D.

D'annunzio Plaintiff, Nancy L. DeVries, commenced this action against her former employer, McNeil Consumer Products Co. (McNeil), and its parent, Johnson & Johnson, Inc. In her complaint she asserted a cause of action for wrongful discharge under the principles announced in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). DeVries alleged that McNeil had discharged her "in violation of the public policy supporting the doctrine of equitable estoppel." The complaint also alleged, in the third count, that defendants "did falsely and maliciously accuse and criticize DeVries in her professional capacity and caused it to be believed that she was not competently discharging her duties and that she was engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices," and that this constituted defamation per se.

Plaintiff now appeals from summary judgments entered on all counts of the complaint in favor of defendant, McNeil.*fn1

DeVries was employed by McNeil as a sales representative, sometimes referred to in the industry as a detail person. In that capacity she called on physicians to acquaint them with McNeil's products and to establish and promote good will on behalf of her employer. The ultimate objective of this exercise was to motivate physicians to prescribe or recommend McNeil products. One of those products was Extra Strength Tylenol caplets. Plaintiff worked for McNeil from 1983 until her discharge in 1986.

Plaintiff's discharge arose out of a confrontation with one of her assigned physicians, a Dr. LaPoff. The controversy arose when DeVries left samples of Extra Strength Tylenol caplets with Dr. LaPoff's office. Those samples contained expiration dates. At the time DeVries left those samples at LaPoff's office the dates either had expired or were close to expiring. DeVries contends that the short-dated samples were left at physicians' offices at McNeil's instructions. Pursuant to those instructions, she informed the doctors' staffs that they were not to be given to patients because they were short dated, but that they were being left for the personal use of the doctors and their staffs. According to DeVries, she also explained to the staffs that caplets used beyond the expiration date were safe and that they merely began to lose effectiveness due to age.

To provide the full flavor of DeVries' version of her instructions from McNeil, we quote from a handwritten activities report prepared by plaintiff on September 9, 1986, approximately five months after she left the caplets at LaPoff's office:

During the last week in March the company (McNeill) sent representatives a huge case of EST caplet (8's) expiring in April 1986 with the instruction to be given to office staff with explicit instructions to tell the staff it was for them only and perfectly safe. This I did in every office I went to.

In the beginning of May I dropped off said samples with instructions for staff on safety and for staff usage only. During the first week in June a Dr. Steven LaPoff at the Immediacenter, 1358 Broad Street in Clifton, screaming hysterically over the telephone -- irate that I left "out of date medication to his staff."

In her deposition testimony, DeVries stated:

The letter that I got at the end of March said in a few weeks you would receive a huge shipment of extra strength Tylenol samples that will be outdated at the end of April. I received that shipment probably the middle of April.

Unfortunately, no one has been able to find a copy of the written instructions or letter referred to by plaintiff.

Apparently Dr. LaPoff's office gave some of the outdated Tylenol to patients who, noticing the expired dates, complained to Dr. LaPoff. One of LaPoff's reactions was to call DeVries and berate her in somewhat intemperate language. Several months later, DeVries was in the office of Dr. Basista, one of Dr. LaPoff's associates in practice, when LaPoff again confronted and criticized her. It is uncontroverted that as plaintiff left his office, with LaPoff continuing to berate her, plaintiff told LaPoff to "grow up."

The office confrontation resulted in a letter from LaPoff to McNeil dated September 14, 1986:

I would like to bring to your attention the unprofessional and unethical practices of your representative Nancy DeVries.

Several months ago, Ms. DeVries knowingly distributed expired samples of Tylenol. When confronted, Ms. DeVries justified this action as appropriate. She stated that the samples were meant to be given to our staff. Unaware that these samples had past expiration dates, several had been given to patients unknowingly. We were placed in a very uncomfortable situation having to explain this action when patients called us concerning the expired product. I subsequently spoke to Ms. DeVries and asked her never to return to this office. Last week, Ms. DeVries returned to Immedicenter to detail us. She offered no apology and had no insight on the levity of her past actions. I once again asked her to leave. Her retort, within earshot of patients and staff was that I "should grow up" and that I was "immature."

Needless to say, my partners and I were appalled over this action by a McNeil representative. Knowingly and willingly giving expired samples of Tylenol is a travesty, especially in light of the past problems McNeil (and parent company Johnson & Johnson) have experienced. In addition, berating a physician with verbal abuse within full view of his patients and staff is disrespectful and downright intolerable.

Immedicenter is an ambulatory care center and it sees approximately 30,000 patients a year. There is great potential to recommend a full line of McNeil products. However, my partners and I will be actively prescribing alternatives to these products unless a satisfactory remedy to this situation is reached. We recommend that Ms. DeVries be dismissed from her position as her actions discredit all the integrity that McNeil has tried to attain. We certainly would never allow her in this office or any future satellite offices. In addition, we will not see any McNeil representative should this situation just be allowed to rest.

Val Brunell, McNeil's national professional sales manager, responded by letter dated September 25, 1986. Brunell apologized to Dr. LaPoff and informed him that the district manager, Mr. Carmen Simone, would contact LaPoff "so that we have a full understanding of the problem and can take appropriate corrective action." Simone called Dr. LaPoff. We find it necessary to quote extensively from Simone's deposition regarding his conversation with Dr. LaPoff. Simone testified that LaPoff said, does your company have a policy of giving out expired samples, and I said, no, sir, we do not.

Q. So you told LaPoff, no, that was not a company policy. Is that right?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. What else did he ask you?

A. He said, well, if it is, then it must be Mrs. DeVries' fault. He proceeded to tell me what she was doing. She had come in their office, gave -- I think it was vials of Extra Strength as samples for his -- he either said nurses to use or I think he said nurses to use or staff, because he said he had a large staff, and somehow those samples got to the patients and the patients -- I don't know how many he said, if it was one or more -- said they came back in the office and called him up and threatened to sue him because they said Dr. LaPoff, how dare you give this stuff out, it expired and it's no good, and Dr. LaPoff was very very angry. I mean that -- I was trying to calm him down on the phone, and I was doing a good job, because he says, it's about time I get someone that knows how to handle the situation.

He said, well, if it wasn't the company's fault, it's Nancy's fault. Let me tell you other things that she's done, this happened awhile ago, and she had the audacity to come back in my office. She said we sat her down and I was telling her off and Nancy got up, walked out on me and turned around in front of my patients in the waiting room and shouted at me. He might have said what -- he might have told me what she said, but I don't recall that or what did she shout. He says I was completely embarrassed that -- to have that done in front of my patients, and he was -- he said I want her -- he says, unless you fire her, we will convert all our Tylenol usage to your competitor, and I believe he mentioned Advil, to be exact. He said I will stop using Tylenol and Extra Strength altogether and we will convert and I will recommend only your competition if you don't terminate her. I believe this woman should be terminated, and if someone does not get back to me with that -- with the facts that she has been terminated, I will do that and. . . . [Emphasis added].

Simone informed Brunnell of his conversation with LaPoff, and Brunnell ordered Simone to fire DeVries. According to Simone, Brunnell told him to attribute her firing to poor human relations skills and poor attitude. Those reasons were placed on DeVries' termination report as the official reasons for her termination. However, according to Simone, Brunnell, upon ordering Simone to fire DeVries, instructed Simone to "tell Dr. LaPoff that we complied with his wishes." Simone also testified that Brunnell said, "I guess the moral of the story and the lesson to be learned is we shouldn't send out samples like this again."

Simone carried out his orders and terminated DeVries.

We first address the summary judgment on the defamation count. The trial court expressed its ruling in three sentences:

In regard to the defamation issue, there is no specific affirmative defamatory statement as a matter of law. The defamatory statement is an indication or inference arising from single conversation between LaPoff and Simone. I'm not satisfied that the inference from that language rises to defamation.

The threshold issue in a defamation action is whether the statements complained of are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning. Decker v. Princeton Packet, 116 N.J. 418, 424, 561 A.2d 1122 (1989); Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 290, 537 A.2d 284 (1988). This threshold issue is a question of law for the court. If a "statement is susceptible of one meaning only, and that meaning is defamatory, the statement is libelous as a matter of law." Romaine, supra, 109 N.J. at 290, 537 A.2d 284. "Conversely, if the statement is susceptible of only a non-defamatory meaning, it cannot be considered libelous, justifying dismissing the action." Ibid. "However, in cases where the statement is capable of being assigned more than one meaning, one of which is defamatory and another not, the question of whether its content is defamatory is one that must be resolved by the trier of fact." Id. at 290-291, 537 A.2d 284. Accord Decker, supra, 116 N.J. at 425, 561 A.2d 1122.

In addressing this threshold issue, "the court must evaluate the criticized language 'according to the fair and natural meaning which it would be given by persons of ordinary intelligence.'" (quoting Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super. 420, 431, 138 A.2d 61 (App.Div.), aff'd on rehearing, 49 N.J. Super. 551, 140 A.2d 529 (App.Div.1958)). In evaluating the language for defamatory content, "the court must view the publication as a whole and consider particularly the context in which the statement appears." Romaine, supra, 109 N.J. at 290, 537 A.2d 284.

Certain categories of statements are defamatory as a matter of law. For example, statements alleging that the subject committed a crime are defamatory per se. Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd., 89 N.J. 451, 459, 446 A.2d 469 (1982); Sokoloy v. Edlin, 65 N.J. Super. 112, 121, 167 A.2d 211 (App.Div.1961). Similarly, "one who falsely and without a privilege to do so publishes a slander which ascribes to another conduct, characteristics or a condition incompatible with the proper conduct of his lawful business, trade, or profession is liable for slander per se." Sokoloy, supra, 65 N.J. Super. at 121-122, 167 A.2d 211. See Mick v. American Dental Ass'n, 49 N.J. Super. 262, 274, 139 A.2d 570 (App.Div.1958) (words imputing to a dentist lack of professional information); Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super. 420, 430, 138 A.2d 61 (App.Div.1958), , aff'd on rehearing, 49 N.J. Super. 551, 140 A.2d 529 (App.Div.1958).

We are satisfied that a jury could conclude that the exchange between Simone and LaPoff, particularly Simone's denial that it was McNeil's policy to distribute expired samples, when taken in context had the capacity to impugn DeVries' professionalism in the health care industry.*fn2 LaPoff, in his September 14, 1986 letter accused DeVries of knowingly distributing expired samples. Simone's failure to explain the circumstances and his denial that it was McNeil's policy to do such a thing, constituted an accusation by McNeil that DeVries had acted unilaterally. That is how LaPoff interpreted his exchange with Simone. See Restatement (Second) of Torts ? 563 (1976) ("The meaning of a communication is that which the recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands that it was intended to express"). As previously indicated, LaPoff told Simone, "Well, if it wasn't the company's fault, it was Nancy's fault."

We reject, therefore, McNeil's contention that its employees made no defamatory communication to anyone regarding DeVries but merely failed to dispute LaPoff's accusations. See Restatement, supra, ? 559, comment a, at 156 ("The word 'communication' is used to denote the fact that one person has brought an idea to the perception of another."); see also Jimenez-Nieves v. United States, 682 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1982) (dishonoring checks negotiated by plaintiff implied defamatory statements about him).

Moreover, by acceding to LaPoff's request that McNeil terminate DeVries, McNeil confirmed the impression it had created, that DeVries had acted unilaterally without McNeil's authority or knowledge and against company policy. A jury could find that McNeil chose to suppress the true facts to mollify a customer at the expense of DeVries' reputation.

McNeil contends that Simone's statement to LaPoff that it was not McNeil's policy to distribute expired Tylenol was true and, therefore, not actionable. See Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd, supra, 89 N.J. at 460, 446 A.2d 469. According to McNeil, it has no policy authorizing the distribution of expired samples. On the contrary, it has a written policy contained in a publication entitled McNeil Consumer Products Company Professional Sales Representative's Manual. It states:

 

Expired Products

Products which have passed the expiration date must be incinerated or poured down a drain.

Although the trial court did not rule on McNeil's truth defense in granting summary judgment, we deem it appropriate to analyze it for the trial court's benefit on remand. There is little doubt that DeVries received a communication from her employer regarding a shipment of short dated Tylenol. According to DeVries, she was ordered to distribute the expiring product to physicians and their staff with instructions that they were for personal use only and were not to be given to patients. McNeil's contention is that once the expiration date was reached, DeVries should have destroyed the remaining product pursuant to the instruction in its sales manual. Therefore, argues McNeil, distribution by DeVries after the April 30 expiration date was a unilateral act by DeVries in violation of company policy.

After a trial, a jury may determine that McNeil's contention is valid. However, the evidence would also suggest that, in light of the surrounding circumstances, the instruction superceded the manual. DeVries serviced over 200 physicians. The timing of DeVries' receipt of the instructions and the shipment may have reasonably suggested to DeVries that the originator of the instruction was aware that not all of the product would be distributed before the expiration date and that she was impliedly authorized to distribute the Tylenol after expiration, given the fact that the product was safe and was not to be given to patients.

Validity of the truth defense does not turn completely on whether McNeil had a written policy regarding expired product in its manual. The issue is whether DeVries exceeded her authority and acted unilaterally in distributing the expired product, for that is the sting of McNeil's communication with LaPoff. See Lawrence, supra, 89 N.J. at 460, 446 A.2d 469 ("For the defense to apply, however, the truth must be as broad as the defamatory imputation or 'sting' of the statement.").

For the same reason, McNeil cannot preserve the summary judgment by relying on a qualified privilege. McNeil contends that it enjoyed a qualified privilege because it had an interest in the subject and pursuant to that interest it made a statement to a person with a corresponding interest. See Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 25 N.J. 541, 564, 138 A.2d 24 (1958) (quoting Rothholz v. Dunkle, 53 N.J.L. 438, 440, 22 A. 193 (E. & A.1891)). However, even if the privilege is applicable, an issue not reached by the trial judge, it may be lost by abuse. See Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 215 N.J. Super. 9, 42-43, 520 A.2d 1154 (App.Div.1987). Whether McNeil abused the privilege is a jury question. Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 565-567, 569 A.2d 793 (1990); Bainhauer, supra, 215 N.J. Super. at 40, 520 A.2d 1154. "[T]he privilege is lost if the speaker knows the matter is false or acts in reckless disregard of its falsity." Bainhauer, supra, 215 N.J. Super. at 42, 520 A.2d 1154. Thus, if the jury finds that McNeil created the false impression that DeVries acted unilaterally, and that McNeil knew that the impression it created was false or acted in reckless disregard of its falsity, then the qualified privilege would not protect McNeil.*fn3

We reverse the summary judgment in favor of defendant McNeil on the third count of the complaint.

We affirm, however, the judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's cause of action under Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).

We recently addressed Pierce and its boundaries in Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Company, 247 N.J. Super. 297, 303-304, 589 A.2d 170 (App.Div.1991), where we stated:

In Pierce, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that an employee at will has a cause of action for wrongful discharge if "the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy." Pierce, supra, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d 505. Although Pierce recognized the cause of action, it affirmed a summary judgment for the employer. Id. at 76, 417 A.2d 505. On the record before it, the Court found that plaintiff, a medical doctor engaged in pharmaceutical research, merely had become involved in "a difference in medical opinion" with her corporate supervisors regarding drug research which was subject to FDA approval and control, and, therefore, it found no violation of public policy in her termination. Id. at 75-76, 417 A.2d 505.

The Pierce cause of action is not unique to New Jersey. Other jurisdictions had recognized a cause of action for discharges violative of public policy, and they were discussed in the Pierce opinion. Id. at 67-70, 417 A.2d 505. In Pierce, the Court stated "[t]he sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions," that "[i]n certain instances, a professional code of ethics may contain an expression of public policy." Id. at 72, 417 A.2d 505.

Recently, New Jersey courts have addressed the application of Pierce. In Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 536 A.2d 237 (1988), the plaintiff alleged that she had been discharged in retaliation for her attempts to determine whether gender discrimination had barred her advancement. Id. at 192, 536 A.2d 237. The Court held that this allegation, if true, would constitute a violation of the public policy established by the Legislature when it adopted New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination. Id. at 192-193, 536 A.2d 237; see N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.

In Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 223 N.J. Super. 435, 538 A.2d 1292 (App.Div.1988), we held that a retaliatory discharge for having filed a worker's compensation claim supported a civil action for damages, in addition to the statutory remedies of reinstatement, back pay and civil penalty. Id. at 442-443, 538 A.2d 1292; see N.J.S.A. 39:15-39.1 and 39.2. We also held that discharge for having filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration was actionable under Pierce. Id. at 445-446, 538 A.2d 1292. Accord Lepore v. National Tool and Mfg. Co., 224 N.J. Super. 463, 470, 540 A.2d 1296 (App.Div.1988), aff'd, 115 N.J. 226, 557 A.2d 1371 (1989), cert denied, [ ] U.S. [ ], 110 S. Ct. 366, 107 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1989).

On the other hand, we have held Pierce to be unavailable where discharge resulted from disputes which were internal and implicated only private interests. In House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J. Super. 42, 556 A.2d 353 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 154, 564 A.2d 874 (1989), plaintiff alleged that he had been terminated because he had complained to his supervisor about the shipment of a product he deemed to be contaminated. We affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that the mere voicing of opposition to corporate policy provides an insufficient foundation for assertion of a Pierce claim. Id. at 49, 556 A.2d 353.

We held in Schwartz v. Leasametric, Inc., 224 N.J. Super. 21, 30, 539 A.2d 744 (App.Div.1988), that termination of an employee to avoid paying commissions did not violate a clear mandate of public policy. We stated that "a cause of action under Pierce has been recognized if the firing was in retaliation for an employee's refusal to commit an act which would violate a statute or for assertion of a right protected by legislation, or for firings which were 'invidiously discriminatory.'" Id. at 30, 539 A.2d 744 (citing Citizens State Bank of N.J. v. Libertelli, 215 N.J. Super. 190, 195, 521 A.2d 867 (App.Div.1987)).

In Alexander v. Kay Finlay Jewelers, 208 N.J. Super. 503, 508, 506 A.2d 379 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 104 N.J. 466, 517 A.2d 449 (1986), we held that in the absence of a statute or regulation prohibiting discharge in retaliation for a civil suit against the employer arising out of a salary dispute, there was no Pierce cause of action. We noted that "the dispute giving rise to the termination of plaintiff's employment involved a matter having no significance beyond the private interests of plaintiff and defendant." Id. at 508, 506 A.2d 379.

The distinction between personal and public interests guided this court in Warthen v. Toms River Community Mem. Hosp., 199 N.J. Super. 18, 488 A.2d 229 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 255, 501 A.2d 926 (1985). Plaintiff, a nurse, had refused to dialyze a terminally ill double amputee because of her moral and philosophical objection to performing the procedure under those circumstances. Id. at 21, 488 A.2d 229. She was discharged. Although plaintiff based her refusal on an ethical code for nurses, we held that plaintiff was motivated by her personal morals, precluding application of Pierce. Id. at 28, 488 A.2d 229. We observed that "[b]y refusing to perform the procedure she may have eased her own conscience, but she neither benefited the society-at-large, the patient nor the patient's family. Id. at 28-29, 488 A.2d 229.

We conclude that DeVries' discharge did not violate a clear mandate of public policy. Although it may have been unfair, it implicated only the private interests of the parties. DeVries reinstatement or an award of damages to her for wrongful discharge would not further any public interest or serve to vindicate any identifiable public policy.

Plaintiff relies on the principle of equitable estoppel as the public policy McNeil violated. In support of her contention, plaintiff cites a trial court decision, Crowell v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 206 N.J. Super. 298, 502 A.2d 573 (Law Div.1984). The context of plaintiff's discharge in Crowell resembled the circumstances in the present case. The Crowell court characterized the circumstances in the following terms:

The plaintiff here was led by his supervisor to believe that the manufacturing defect which he ignored was one that the company invited him to ignore. Promptly thereafter Transamerica fired him for accepting its invitation. That conduct is unconscionable. It violates public policy and creates a cause of action in contract, tort or both.

Id. at 306, 502 A.2d 573.

Based on those facts the trial court ruled that the principle of equitable estoppel applied and that "[a]ny conceivable definition of 'public policy' as that term is used in Pierce, would have to embrace the concept [of equitable estoppel]." Ibid.

We disagree with Crowell and hereby disapprove of it. Pierce recognized a limited exception to the right of an employer to discharge an at will employee. Pierce, supra, 84 N.J. at 73, 417 A.2d 505 ("If an employee does not point to a clear expression of public policy, the court can grant a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment"). Despite attachment of the equitable estoppel label, the discharge in Crowell, though unfair, like DeVries discharge, involved private, not public, interests. Cf. Erickson, supra, 117 N.J. at 560, 569 A.2d 793 (an employer has an absolute right to discharge an 'at-will' employee even if that employee has retained a lawyer to protest the employer's action -- provided only that the employer not violate any clear mandate of public policy.").

The summary judgment on counts one and two are affirmed; the summary judgment on count three is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

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  Opinion Footnotes 

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 *fn1 Plaintiff's notice of appeal limited the appeal to "the order granting summary judgment to McNeil Consumer Products Co." Accordingly the judgment in favor of defendant Johnson & Johnson, Inc. is not before us.

*fn2 DeVries also has a nursing degree.

*fn3 If it is determined that McNeil enjoyed a qualified privilege, then plaintiff must establish its abuse by clear and convincing evidence. Erickson, supra, 117 N.J. at 565, 569 A.2d 793.